Tax optimization and MCDA: risk and return case study

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Key Words
Tax law, multinational companies, tax incentives, MCDA, risks.

Abstract
This study is willing to analyze on one hand tax techniques used by multinational companies in order to optimize their “consolidated” tax expenditures regarding transfer pricing regulations, and on the other hand Tax authorities’ “defenses” in order for them to develop their respective tax provisions and regulations. This analysis will thus consider the different risks (legal, tax…) assumed by managers when they decide their tax planning. To do so, this paper is aiming to study if a model can help multinational companies to identify and minimize risks associated to tax optimization within international transactions. Likewise, we will analyze the contribution of multi-criteria methods in achieving such objective given that mostly qualitative variables will be at stake.

Introduction
Despite the remarkable development of multinational groups and their growing importance in the economic life of countries, they are rarely recognized for tax purposes. Indeed, tax administrations do not have a worldwide appreciation of these groups due to the implementation of fiscal jurisdiction on the national territory only. Fiscal administrations can theoretically choose to apply either the method of taxation based on residence or the method based on the source. In practice, both of these two methods are often applied simultaneously. For this reason, multinational groups can hardly have a global vision of their tax expenditures. Moreover, legal and administrative requirements vary from one country to another, obliging groups to examine the transactions they perform in their various associated companies.

Consequently, international tax planning remains one of the most complex and taboo subjects. Complex because of the multitude criteria, variables and constraints to be taken into account; taboo because some governments tolerate practices prohibited internationally attracting foreign direct investment. We will try within this paper to see and explain how a multi-criteria model (MCDA) can help multinational companies to optimize their consolidated tax cost regarding the transfer pricing. In the first part we will present a summary of regulations related to transfer pricing (both internationally and Moroccan case). In the second part, we will explain how a concrete optimization model can be designed and developed.

1. Transfer pricing and tax planning: cost optimization or risk minimization?

It is generally agreed that companies making international transactions with dependent companies must set their prices under the arm’s length principle. This principle, internationally recognized in most countries, means that dependent companies, located in different countries, must practice the same prices that would have been practiced in the market between two independent companies. The basis of this principle is found both in international law as well as in the Moroccan tax procedures, which also contain more guidance on how to document the transfer pricing.

International regulations
1.1. OECD Model Tax Convention – Article 9

This article explains how to apply the arm’s length principle. It allows a correction of the profits if affiliated companies negotiate, for their international commercial and financial relations, conditions which
have not been accepted by an independent company. These clauses limit the national laws and allow the application of an uniform international arm's length principle.

1.1.2. OCDE principles

Since 1995, the OECD issued several directives on the application of arm’s length principle for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines). The OECD has encouraged the adoption of a common interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention and thereby reduced the risk of inappropriate taxation and provided the means of solving problems occurring during the interaction of law and practices in different countries. Although the legal status of OECD principles differs between member states, they are nevertheless generally accepted as reference by the tax authorities for the application of arm's length principle. The OECD has brought together the expertise of the member states and balanced the interests of different jurisdictions.

1.2. Moroccan regulations

The issue of transfer pricing is discussed in section 213 -II and III- of the tax code and also in different tax treaties signed by the kingdom of Morocco.

1.2.1. Section 213 of tax code:

Section 213 in its paragraphs II and III states:

"II. When a company has direct or indirect dependency relationships with companies in Morocco or outside of Morocco, the profits indirectly transferred, either by increasing or decreasing prices for the purchase or sale or by any other means, are reported in taxable income and/or sales reported. For this correction, the profits indirectly transferred as indicated above, are determined by comparison with those of similar companies or through direct assessment on the basis of information available to the administration.

III. When the importance of certain expenses incurred abroad or by foreign companies with an ongoing activity in Morocco is not justified, the administration may limit the amount or determine the tax basis of company in comparison with similar companies or through direct assessment on the basis of information available."

The section 213 has a very general scope as it concerns all indirect transfers of profits regardless of the country in question. The analysis of this section leads to the following remarks:

1. This section focuses more on the dissuasive side of transfer pricing rather than the conditions under which the administration may be required to accept transfer pricing between companies of the same group;
2. The regulations include any means leading to indirect transfer of profits and refer specifically to the increase and decrease of purchase or sale prices. In addition, the use of “other means” may reflect the will of the tax authorities to control a difficult and changing economic reality. Other means might mean for example: very long payment deadlines for customers, unusual short payment deadlines for suppliers, unnecessary purchased services...

In the old circular provisions of former section 35 of the tax code on corporation tax, the tax authorities stated that the transfers could result in indirect benefits in cases of:

- The increase of purchasing prices of imported goods and services;
- The decrease in selling prices of exported goods and services;
- The practice of reduced interest rates;
- The excessive or unreal management fees;
- Write-off of revenue;
- Various clearing operations...

3. The Moroccan legislator specifies two methods for the adjustment of transfer prices:

- Price comparison with similar businesses: This is to evaluate transaction prices by comparing them with data from similar companies. One might believe that the Moroccan tax administration considers only the comparable uncontrolled prices (CUP) method on the open market as the only method of determining transfer pricing, which does not comply with OECD principles. Instead, we believe that the Moroccan legislator referred to arm’s length principle without citing it expressly. This thesis is supported by the view expressed by Mr Nouredine Bensouda, former Director of Taxation, in his paper presented in Geneva at the meeting of the Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (10-14 September 2001). Mr Bensouda ranked Morocco with countries that do not explicitly mention the concept of arm’s length, but allow an adjustment of transfer prices in accordance with the principle. In addition, Morocco participates in various
meetings of the OECD which shows that Moroccan regulations respect the methods provided by the OECD.

- Direct assessment on the basis of information available to tax authorities: to provide the tax authority with absolute power to estimate the prices of individual transactions which is not consistent with the principles of OECD. The text provides no hierarchy between the direct assessment and the comparative method. Many experts believe that this measure, if applied, will be abusive.

1.2.2. International tax treaties:
In different tax treaties signed by Morocco, a typical clause is included stating:

"When

a) an enterprise of a contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other contracting State, or

b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a contracting State and an enterprise of the other contracting State, and in both cases the two enterprises have, in their commercial or financial relations, imposed conditions which differ from those which would be agreed between independent enterprises, then any profits which could have been realized in absence of these conditions can be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly."

In addition, sections of these tax treaties relating to fees and interests state that:

"When, due to a special relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner or any other person, the amount of royalties (or interest) exceeds the amount which the payer and the beneficial owner in the absence of such relationship could have agreed, the provisions of this Article shall apply only to the last amount. In this case, the over-payments are subject to tax under the laws of each contracting State".

One might conclude that: Moroccan law) is a deterrent and gives more discretion to the administration, b) refers only to a single method of transfer pricing: the comparable price (CUP) in the market, c) does not provide the conditions under which the administration would be required to accept transfer prices and consider them reasonable. d) despite the absence of clarification, the methods provided by the OECD, when properly used and well documented, could force the administration to accept the transfer prices between group members.

1.3. Transfer pricing risks

1.3.1. Tax risks

1.3.1.1. Presumption of transfer of profits

Inter-company transactions are presumed to differ from arm's length because of the dependence of these companies. Thus, several international laws require corporations to set up a documentation proving that their transactions meet the arm's length principle and are not motivated by a transfer of profits between states to optimize consolidated tax cost.

1.3.1.2. Apprehension of transferred profits

The economic approach of transfer pricing is essentially comparative and companies can justify their prices by reference to market prices. The comparable price is the price that would have agreed two independent companies when realizing a comparable transaction. A comparable transaction refers to a comparable product or service under comparable conditions.

The criteria of comparability for products are: the nature, the quality, the innovation, the delivery time, the presence of an intangible asset attached to the product (trademark, patent ...), the degree of finish….For services, the comparison criteria are: the nature of service (administrative, commercial, financial,...), the knowledge attached to the service, the turnaround time.

The criteria typically used to assess the conditions of the transactions are: the volume of sales (which can lead to declining prices), the level of the market (producer, wholesaler, distributor ...), geographical location, date of the transaction, accessories for sale, the presence of intangibles attached to the transaction...

1.3.1.3. Theory of the normal act of management
There are no legal provisions that expressly provide for rejection of commercial transactions by tax authorities justified by the theory of normal act of management. However, the various tax authorities have a practice of rejecting abnormal acts based on "the theory of lack of interest in the operation." However, freedom of enterprise and management is one of the essential characteristics of a liberal economy. The Moroccan tax system, for example, is founded upon this principle and therefore the tax administration must be careful not to interfere in the management, even if the results of such management would have been financially disastrous. On the other hand, the need to safeguard the interests of the state led to impose limits on the principle of freedom of management. Thus, tax authorities react when the management choices lead to the decrease of the tax basis.

According to Professor Maurice Cozian (2008), the theory of normal act of management and transfer pricing regime are two bases that overlap more often, but sometimes are substituted for one another. The tax administration uses both the first and the second basis for sanctioning the acts of management that seem contrary to the interests of the company. This limitation applied in all the circumstances of the business, but especially in intra-group transactions.

In conclusion, any act of management considered irrelevant and any operation performed under abnormal conditions (a gift for example) should not affect the tax basis. Thus, a taxpayer which has concluded an act contrary to the interest of the company would be required to pay the tax regardless this transaction.

1.3.2. Legal risks

From a legal standpoint, the transfer pricing may fall within the scope of regulated agreements and constitute, in some cases, criminal acts. Legal risks related to transfer pricing are much more unknown than the tax risks. This certainly comes from the fact that the financial consequences, at least in the short term are less significant for companies. However, these risks represent a real threat to the managers of the entities and executives of the group. Indeed, the manipulation of transfer pricing may constitute an abuse of corporate assets or lead to a rupture of equality among shareholders.

1.3.2.1. The misuse of corporate assets

Indeed, the law 17-95 in its Section 384 defines the crime of misuse of corporate assets as the fact that members of the administrative and management of a limited company, which, intentionally, have made of the property or the credit of the Corporation (the powers they possessed and / or voice they had) a use contrary to the economic interests of society, for personal reasons or to give preferential treatment to another company or business in which they were interested directly or indirectly. We can see that this section is applicable in case of transfer pricing policies contrary to the interest of some group entities.

The following cases are considered risky:

- The applied prices "transfer pricing" are different from arm's length price;
- Payment terms are different from those used with other trading partners (outside the group);
- Even if the Moroccan courts haven't had yet to rule on these cases, the very strong resemblance with the French law of July 1996 would make the French jurisprudence serve as a source of interpretation to be used by Moroccan judges. The French jurisprudence emphasizes the need to respect the following conditions:
  - The existence of a real counterpart;
  - The existence of a balanced exchange:
    - The price charged should not be less than the cost, except in exceptional circumstances or in the presence of specific considerations;
    - Determining what price should be fair.

Also, the write-off of a receivable in favour of the mother company can cause an imbalance in cash of the subsidiary and may constitute an abuse of social property.

1.3.2.2. The abuse of majority
The abuse of majority punishes any vote contrary to the social interest and issued in the favour of the majority shareholders to the detriment of other shareholders. If this principle has been cited in the case of cash advances, it seems to apply to all intra-group transactions. The objective is the protection of minority shareholders but also protect the interests of company. The abuse of majority, if established, will invalidate the decisions made.

1.3.3. Financial risks
Transfer pricing based on cost plus method (cost plus a margin) are especially sensitive: companies using this method might be tempted to increase their production costs to increase their turnover. In this case, additional costs for the group can quickly become significant. The implementation of a transfer pricing policy should help to prevent such situations.

1.3.4. Customs risks
Generally, customs administrations consider the arm’s length prices for the application of tariffs to the value of goods. Not meeting this principle in customs values can have serious consequences (financial penalties, legal responsibility of corporate managers if the case of fraud is established…). Moreover, manipulating transfer prices is considered as illegal transfer of funds in contravention of the foreign exchange regulations.

1.3.4. Actions to take in hand social liabilities
Given the general principle of the autonomy of companies which states that a company can’t be held by the commitment of another one, the creditors may be tempted to assert the mutual responsibility of companies whose economic and financial ties are too narrow, whenever they qualify their receivables as bad debt. Moreover, in case of reorganization or liquidation proceedings against a company owned by a group, application of transfer pricing which deprived the subsidiary in question may also give rise to an action to take in hand liabilities. If transfer prices have caused the impoverishment of the company, the managers may be asked to reimburse the social liabilities.

2. Can we optimize tax risk with the Multicriteria decision aid (MCDA) method?
2.1. Definition and basis of MCDA

2.1.1. Definition of multicriteria aggregation
For years, the “decision making” was the object of many papers and publications. All aspects related to this subject have been broadly commented in management science. There are two approaches to MCDA. The first method, adopted and defended by Anglo-Saxon countries, consists to aggregate all decision criteria. The concept of multicriteria aggregation procedure is at the heart of this method and is based on a single criterion synthesis (Roy and Bouyssou 1993). That’s why, some authors name it the approach of the single criterion synthesis as it denies any incomparability. The second approach, adopted by French countries, is the opposite of the first as it distinguishes between the core actions (decisions, choices ...) and the other actions less preferable. This movement of partial integration, called also the outranking approach, accepts incomparability.

Other methods either adopt a middle position between the French movement and the Anglo-Saxon ones or simply follow another path. It is then the interactive local judgement with multiple trial-error iterations. There is a fundamental difference between the aggregation procedures contained in multicriteria methods in the first two approaches, but in both the two approaches preferences are introduced a priori. In the first approach, American-inspired, local preferences (at the level of each attribute) are aggregated into a unique function (value, utility) to optimize. Different papers working on multicriteria methods study the conditions of aggregation, the particular forms of the aggregating function and methods of construction of these functions (both locally and globally). The main methods belonging to this approach are: MAUT, SMART, UTA, TOPSIS, AHP and GP.

The second approach, adopted by French countries, aimed initially to build binary relations, called outranking relations, to represent the preferences of policymakers, given the available information. In some of multicriteria methods, before building these relationships, we introduce discrimination thresholds (indifference, preference) and even veto, at each one of the criteria for modelling locally the preferences of the decision maker. These relationships are generally neither transitive nor complete. In a
second step, these relations are used to help formulating a recommendation which suits the decision problem. The formulation is performed taking into account the decision issue. In fact, aid to decision doesn’t mean necessarily or only choosing the best solution. The decision aid may cover other issues than the choice itself.

This approach includes methods that are perhaps not based on a good axiomatic but are imbued with a realistic data given the pragmatic decision settings often encountered. This approach is quite rich in new concepts, like those of decision problems, the discriminating power of a test…. The main methods or method families belonging to this approach are: ELECTRE, PROMETHEE, ORESTES, QUALIFLEX ...

This summary of multicriteria methods isn’t exhaustive since others are found in literature. For example, several methods are used to treat various imperfections of the information contained in the evaluations that these imperfections are of probabilistic nature, fuzzy or mixed.

### 2.1.2. Major theories and schools of multi-criteria methods

The following chart presents a comparison of the three major schools in decision aid through multi-criteria approaches:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Anglo-saxon</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Local judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregation Mode</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Interactive and local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>One criterion of synthesis</td>
<td>Outranking</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploited relations</td>
<td>Preferences, indifference</td>
<td>Strong and weak preferences, indifference</td>
<td>Interaction decision maker / person in charge of studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the analysis of this chart, we understand that the three approaches have considered the multi-criteria method through the standpoint of decisions makes. They differ in the way they set these preferences. There is no ideal method. The choice of an appropriate method and the performance of the consequent decisions depend on the situation and the nature of the problem. The Anglo-Saxon approach is clear and simple and lead to important results by combining all criteria and sub-criteria. Its use is limited by methodological considerations (rigid Hypothesis, Much supplementary information required from decision makers, Judgement commensurability …) and structural considerations (judgement complete transitivity, balancing between criteria…)

The French school has introduced the binary comparison between criteria and broadened this comparison to include the degree: strong criterion, weak criterion, pseudo-criterion ... This approach accepts the incomparability between actions and defines other forms of preference relationships (dominance, outranking…). However, it has some limits related to the relatively limited number of actions and to the subjectivity of the final decision of choosing one action among many others.

Local and interactive judgement approach gives the possibility of permanent interaction within the decision making process, between the decision maker and the person in charge of studies. It permits to take more actions into account. The use of these methods can be limited by:

- Intrinsic considerations: unlimited number of interactions, satisfaction threshold of the decision.
- Extrinsic considerations: conflicts between decision makers, the decision makers should be available, a trust between the decision maker and the person in charge of studies.
2.2. The chosen method: PROMETHEE Method (JP Brans, Ph Vincke, B Mareschal 1984)

2.2.1. Reasons for the choice of the method

PROMETHEE is the acronym of Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment Evaluations. There are four similar. Two of them have a lot of success thanks to the availability of a commercial software with a successful interface.

PROMETHEE is different from ELECTRE method in that it sets more intensive outranking relations: we can consider that the PROMETHEE methods are between the approach of outranking and the MAUT methods. The software includes graphic representations to set g functions.

PROMETHEE compares actions two by two and measures the preference intensity \( P(a,b) \) of one action compared to the other for each criterion through the function \( p(d) \) where \( d \) represents the difference of evaluations \( g(a) - g(b) \) for this criterion.

For a given criterion, a value \( P(a,b) = 0 \) expresses no preference of \( a \) from \( b \), a value \( P(a,b) = 1 \) expresses a strong preference of \( a \) from \( b \), progressive intermediate values between 0 and 1 express first a progressive preferences of \( a \).

The function \( p(d) \) can take different forms and depend of some parameters:

1. True criterion:
   \[ p(d) = 0 \text{ if } d \leq 0 \text{ and } p(d) = 1 \text{ if } d > 0 \]
2. Quasi criterion:
   \[ p(d) = 0 \text{ if } d \leq q \text{ and } p(d) = 1 \text{ if } d > q \text{ where } q \text{ is the threshold of indifference} \]
3. Criterion with linear preferences
   \[ p(d) = 0 \text{ if } d \leq 0 , \text{ and } \frac{d}{p} \text{ if } d > 0 \text{ where } p \text{ is the threshold} \]
4. Criterion with levels
   \[ p(d) = 0 \text{ if } d \leq q , \text{ and } \frac{1}{2} \text{ if } q < d \leq p \text{ and } p(d) = 1 \text{ if } d > p \text{ where } q \text{ and } p \text{ are classical thresholds} \]
5. Mix criterion
   \[ p(d) = 0 \text{ if } d \leq q , \text{ and } (d-q)/(p-q) \text{ if } q < d \leq p \text{ and } p(d) = 1 \text{ if } d > p \text{ where } q \text{ and } p \text{ are classical thresholds} \]
6. Gauss criterion
   \[ p(d) = 1 - \exp \left( - \frac{d^2}{2 \sigma^2} \right) \text{ where } \sigma^2 \text{ is a parameter similar to the variance of a normal distribution} \]

The criterion with levels is similar to the pseudo-criterion
The mix criterion is also called with linear preference with indifference area.

In the above notations, we intentionally ignored the reference to the criterion \( c \), We should have written \( P_c(a,b) \) and define it by \( p(d_c) \)

2.2.2. Case study of tax optimization applied to transfer pricing

Let’s take the case of a multinational company "Alpha" which nationality is "V" wishing to install a production and selling unit of its products (three product lines A, B and C) to serve the southern European markets and North Africa. The products have the following characteristics:

- A: is a premium product. Marketing studies have shown that the company can sell 90% in Mediterranean Europe and only 10% in North Africa. It represents about 20% of total sales of "Alpha".
- B: is an average product range that can be sold at 50% in each of these two regions. B represents 50% of total sales of "Alpha".
- C: is a fast fashion product that can be sold at 80% in North Africa and 20% in Mediterranean Europe. C represents 30% of sales of "Alpha".

The company "Alpha" has four options:

- Locate the unit in the country X: action 1
- Locate the unit in the country Y: action 2
- Locate the unit in the country W: action 3
- Locate the unit in the country Z: action 4

Net income before taxes (based on different scenarios and transportation costs) is estimated:

- 18% of sales if the company is located in the country "X"
- 15% of sales if the company is located in the country "Y"
- 12% of sales if the company is located in the country "W"
- 35% of sales if the company is located in the country "Z"

“Alpha” considers in its choice the following factors:
Country risk on a scale of 1 to 5:
- X: 4
- Y: 5
- W: 4
- Z: 2

Taxation of installation is neutral (almost equal in both countries)
Legislation related to transfer pricing: the company can expect some reduction in its tax cost if it practices transfer prices different from arm's length price. In this case, the profit will be located in the country "V" where the rate would be lower. That being:
- X: non-transparent regulations, legal texts are not clear but in practice few cases of tax adjustments have been recorded so far. So, moderate risk with possibility of optimization. 10% of possible tax reduction.
- Y: legislation more transparent with texts more clear and the obligation of transfer pricing documentation. More new cases of adjustments have been reported. The risk is greater if the company deviates from arm's length price. 0% of tax reduction.
- W: non-transparent regulations, legal texts are not clear but in practice few cases of tax adjustments have been recorded so far. So, moderate risk with possibility of optimization. 5% of possible tax reduction.
- Z: legal texts are not clear but in practice no case of tax adjustments have been recorded so far. So, weak risk with possibility of optimization. 25% of possible tax reduction.

The rate of corporation income tax in the country "X" is:
- 30% for deliveries within the country (about 5% of the consolidated total turnover for each category) and 17.5% for export.
- In the country "Y", the CIT rate is 33.33% for deliveries within the country (about 20% of total revenues for each of the first two categories A and B) and 18% for export.
- In the country "W", the CIT rate is 25% for deliveries within the country (about 20% of total revenues for each of the first two categories A and B) and 15% for export.
- In the country "Z", the CIT rate is 28% for deliveries within the country (about 20% of total revenues for each of the first two categories A and B) and 20% for export.

Legal Legislation:
- X: No history of criminal condemnation for a manager due to a misuse of corporate assets, abuse of majority ... Low risk: 4
- Y: More and more cases of managers condemned. Risk: 2
- W: Moderate risk : 3
- Z: More and more cases of managers condemned. Risk: 2

Customs risks:
- X: Customs are very transparent. Risk: 3
- Y: The texts are clearer and more transparent. Risk: 4
- W: The texts are clearer and more transparent. Risk: 4
- Z: Customs are very transparent. Risk: 2

The problem would be to optimize the tax cost of operations given the different levels of risk as above. So in which country "Alpha" have to install its production unit?

Criteria:
1. Part of profit / turnover
2. Country risk
3. Corporation Income tax rate
4. Legal regulations
5. Customs regulations
6. Transfer pricing opportunities

Chosen method: Why PROMETHEE?
It is a ranking method by preference. It is suitable and appropriate to our objective. The other methods define a set of good choices without ranking them (French methods ELECTRE), or aggregate all criteria in one criterion of synthesis (Anglo-Saxon approach).

**Chart 1: Assessment of actions 1 to 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Max / Min</th>
<th>action 1</th>
<th>Action 2</th>
<th>action 3</th>
<th>Action 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part of profit / turnover</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country risk</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Scale 1 to 5</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation Income tax CIT (internal)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33,33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIT (export)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>17,5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal regulations</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Scale 1 to 5</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs regulations</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Scale 1 to 5</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer price opportunity</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Promethee ranking:**

It seems that action 2 is appropriate to reach the objective of optimization as stated above and taking into account all criteria. It is also stated that weighting criterions plays a decisive role in the final ranking. This weighting expresses the preferences of the decision Maker which translates the originality of PROMETHEE method.

Graph 1: PROMETHEE ranking

This study has shown that «PROMETHEE” method, and more generally multicriteria tools, can play a major role in problem resolution for tax optimization issues. Tax planning takes into account a set of different and contradictory criteria. The multicriteria methods tend to arbitrate and moderate between different points of views.

**Conclusion**

Within this paper we have tried to show explicitly how tax planning can be done by multinational companies. We concluded that tax optimization have some risks: tax risk, legal risk, financial risk and customs risk. The use of multicriteria methods is so helpful to achieve such objective. There are different schools (Anglo-Saxon, French, local judgement…) of multicriteria methods that can be used depending on the situation and the scope of the decisions to be taken.

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